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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Alaa “Alex” Mohammad Ali never set out to make history. He just 
needed a job.1 Nevertheless, on February 23, 2008, Ali took his first 
step toward making history, and did it with blood on his hands.2 What 
began as an argument with a fellow translator on a U.S. military base 
near Baghdad quickly escalated into a fight.3 It ended just as quickly, 
with Ali allegedly stabbing the other man in the chest four times.4 Of 
course, while terrible, a simple assault is hardly history making, or even 
                                                                                                                     
 * J.D. Expected 2010, University of Florida Levin College of Law; B.A. in journalism, 
University of Central Florida. I would like to thank Professor Diane Mazur for inspiring me to 
write on a topic I might otherwise not have considered and Christopher Deem for always 
knowing exactly what more was needed. I would also like to thank my family for loving me, 
encouraging me and putting up with me throughout this process—I am fortunate to have each of 
you in my life. Finally, I would like to dedicate this Note to my father. Te amo y te extraño 
Papa. 
 1. Emma Schwartz, First Contractor Charged Under Military Justice System, U.S. NEWS 
&  WORLD REP., Apr. 5, 2008, available at http://www.usnews.com/articles/news/iraq/2008/04/ 
05/first-contractor-charged-under-military-justice-system.html. 
 2. Michael R. Gordon, U.S. Charges Contractor at Iraq Post in Stabbing, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 5, 2008, at A6; Schwartz, supra note 1. 
 3. Gordon, supra note 2; Schwartz, supra note 1. 
 4. Gordon, supra note 2; Schwartz, supra note 1. 
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newsworthy, given the daily carnage in Iraq.5 So what makes Ali’s story 
so special? 
On March 27, 2008, Ali became the first civilian contractor working 
for the United States since 1968 to be criminally charged by the U.S. 
military.6 The charges were the first to be levied under Congress’ 2006 
amendment to 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10),7 which expanded the reach of the 
military justice system to “persons serving with or accompanying an 
armed force in the field” during even contingency operations8—a 
profound shift from the pre-amendment need for a war formally 
declared by Congress.9 Because U.S. citizens are generally immune 
from prosecution in U.S. courts for crimes committed abroad10 nd 
cannot be tried by the military outside of exceptionally limited 
circumstances,11 the amendment’s proponents hoped that the 
amendment would finally close the jurisdictional gap that allowed 
civilian contractors to operate abroad without fear of criminal 
prosecution for any unlawful action.12  
Instead, the amendment has ignited a storm of controversy13 and put 
Ali’s otherwise mundane case into the limelight. Michael Navarre, a 
former member of the Navy’s Judge Advocate General’s Corps (JAG) 
who now works in private practice, explained that “[Ali’s case] is a 
significant test case because the constitutionality of the new amendment 
will be litigated . . . . There is a question as to whether the Congress 
extended the power of the military too far.”14  
Navarre was not alone in raising the question of the amendment’s 
constitutionality; besides commentators and academics, even the 
                                                                                                                     
 5. Gordon, supra note 2; Schwartz, supra note 1. 
 6. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, CONTRACTORS’  SUPPORT OF U.S. OPERATIONS IN 
IRAQ 23 (2008) [hereinafter CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE]; Jeremy Scahill, An Iraqi 
Contractor Gets Prosecuted While Blackwater’s Contract is Renewed, THE NATION (N.Y.), Apr. 
10, 2008, available at http://www.alternet.org/module/printversion/81977. 
 7. Gordon, supra note 2; Schwartz, supra note 1. 
 8. John Warner National Defense Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-364, § 552, 
120 Stat. 2083, 2217 (2006); CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 6, at 23. 
 9. See United States v. Averette, 19 C.M.A. 363, 365 (1970) (2-1 decision). 
 10. Del Quentin Wilber & Karen DeYoung, Justice Department Moves Toward Charges 
Against Contractors in Iraq Shooting, WASH. POST, Aug. 17, 2008, at A1. 
 11. See infra notes 153, 158 and accompanying text. 
 12. See Griff Witte, New Law Could Subject Civilians to Military Trial, WASH. POST, Jan. 
15, 2007, at A1. Generally speaking, U.S. civilians travelling abroad can only be criminally 
charged and tried by the authorities of the locality they are in. Such is currently not possible in 
Iraq due to an immunity agreement obtained by the United States from Iraq’s Coalition 
Provisional Authority. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 6, at 23; Sudarsan 
Raghavan, Progress Cited on U.S.-Iraq Pacts; Foreign Minister Says Nations Are Working to 
Resolve Differences, WASH. POST, July 3, 2008, at A13 (describing how immunity could soon 
evaporate, exposing contractors to local criminal jurisdiction).  
 13. Gordon, supra note 2. 
 14. Id. 
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government has been wary of the constitutionality of the amendment.15 
The Congressional Budget Office16 reported that “using the [Uniform 
Code of Military Justice] to prosecute civilians, even during a war, may 
generate constitutional challenges based on the standards of due process 
applicable to military courts.”17 This might explain why the Department 
of Defense waited nearly seventeen months after passage of the 
amendment18 before it issued a memorandum directing the military 
branches on how to begin employing the military’s newly authorized 
jurisdiction.19 Notably, Ali was charged only days later, though he had 
already been in military custody for thirty-three days.20 Some 
commentators, as well as Ali’s military attorney, have thus postulated 
that the government is using Ali, who is not an American citizen, as a 
legal lab rat.21 “They want to test out a new American law on somebody 
who is not even an American,” said Captain Clay Compton, Ali’s 
attorney.22  
If a legal laboratory was the military’s intent, its experiment was a 
success. Originally charged with aggravated assault, Ali pled guilty on 
June 22, 2008, to lesser charges of wrongful appropriation of a knife 
owned by a U.S. soldier, obstruction of justice for wrongfully disposing 
of the knife, and making a false official statement to military 
investigators.23 As a result of his plea, Ali’s assault charge, which 
carried an independent maximum penalty of eight years confinement,24 
was dismissed,25 and Ali would spend only five months in 
                                                                                                                     
 15. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 6, at 23. 
 16. “[The Congressional Budget Office] produces policy analyses, cost estimates of 
legislation, and budget and economic projections that serve as a basis for the Congress’s 
decisions about spending and taxes. Every piece of legislation affecting the use of the nation’s 
resources undergoes [the office’s] scrutiny.” Congressional Budget Office, Who We Are, 
http://www.cbo.gov/employment/whoweare.shtml (last visited Jan. 28, 2010). 
 17. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 6, at 23; see also JENNIFER K. ELSEA &  
NINA M. SERAFINO, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS IN 
IRAQ: BACKGROUND, LEGAL STATUS, AND OTHER ISSUES 20–21 (2007). 
 18. Memorandum from Sec’y of Def. Robert M. Gates to Sec’ys of the Military Dep’ts, 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Under Sec’ys of Def., Commanders of the Combatant 
Commands 1–3 (Mar. 10, 2008), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/dod/gates-
ucmj.pdf [hereinafter Gates Memorandum].  
 19. Id. at 1–2. 
 20. See supra notes 2, 6 and accompanying text. 
 21. See Scahill, supra note 6. 
 22. Id. 
 23. See Press Release, Multi-National Force-Iraq, Multi-National Corps–Iraq, Pub. Affairs 
Office, Camp Victory, Civilian Contractor Convicted at a Court-Martial (June 23, 2008), 
available at http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com content&task=view&id=20671&I 
temid=128 [hereinafter Press Release, Multi-National Force-Iraq]. 
 24. Simon Montlake, U.S. Soldier Convicted of Assault in Iraq Death, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR, Feb. 21, 2008, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0221/p99s01-duts.html. 
 25. Press Release, Multi-National Force-Iraq, supra note 23. 
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confinement.26  
The decision in Ali’s case, however, does not render the issue moot. 
Perhaps as a result of its initial success, the military has not hesitated in 
utilizing its new authority. In January 2009, it began court-martial 
proceedings against two more civilian contractors in Iraq.27 In response, 
each contractor, in petitions for writs of habeas corpus filed in federal 
court, challenged the military’s ability to exercise constitutionally such 
jurisdiction, specifically raising the issue of whether such jurisdiction is 
allowable outside the context of a declared war.28  
Critically, the viability of the statute depends on this very issue. This 
Note will therefore resolve whether Congress extended the power of the 
military too far when it amended 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10). Part II 
illustrates the problems that arise with the absence of civil or military 
jurisdiction over criminal acts committed by civilian contractors. Part 
III describes the failure of Congress’ attempts to subject civilian 
contractors to civilian criminal jurisdiction and the resulting need for 
the amendment to 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10). Part IV analyzes judicial 
precedent concerning previous attempts to expand military jurisdiction 
to civilians. Finally, Part V concludes by stating definitively that 10 
U.S.C. § 802(a)(10) is constitutional.  
II.   THE PROBLEM OF “COWBOY”  CONTRACTORS 
Omar H. Waso, a senior Kurdish official, could not believe his eyes. 
On September 16, 2007, from a rooftop overlooking Nisoor Square in 
Baghdad, Iraq, Waso watched as private security contractors from 
Blackwater Worldwide (Blackwater)29 fired machine guns and grenade 
launchers at anything that moved.30 “Women and children, all of them 
                                                                                                                     
 26. Id. His subsequent collateral attack on the authority of the military to exercise 
jurisdiction over him was dismissed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces 
(CAAF), the “supreme court” of military justice. Ali v. Austin, Misc. No. 09-8001/AR 
(C.A.A.F. Nov. 5, 2008) (petition summarily dismissed). 
 27. See Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Adolph v. Gates, No. 1:09-cv-00135 (D.C. 
Cir. Jan. 23, 2009); see also Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Price v. Gates, No. 1:09-cv-
00106 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 16, 2009). 
 28. See Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Adolph, (No. 1:09-cv-00135); see also 
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Price, (No. 1:09-cv-00106). But see Keith Rogers, No 
Court-Martial for Man Suspected in Spy Plane Fire, LAS VEGAS REV. J., Jan. 23, 2009, at B1.  
 29. Blackwater Worldwide was formerly known as Blackwater USA and is owned by Erik 
Prince, a former U.S. Navy SEAL. Memorandum from Majority Staff to the H. Comm. on 
Oversight and Gov’t Reform 5 (Oct. 1, 2007), available at 
http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20071001121609.pdf [hereinafter Majority Staff 
Memorandum]. From 2001 to 2006, Blackwater received over a billion dollars in government 
contracts. Id. at 4. On May 8, 2006, the State Department awarded Blackwater a diplomatic 
security contract with a maximum value of $1.2 billion per contractor, or $3.6 billion in total. Id. 
at 4–5. 
 30. James Glanz, New Evidence that Guards Took No Fire, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2007, at 
4
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were shouting and crying,” he said. “They killed innocent people for no 
reason.”31 
According to testimony given by Erik Prince, Blackwater’s owner, 
before the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, the 
contractors responded only after coming under fire.32 “[T]eam members 
returned fire at threatening targets,” he said in prepared testimony. 
“Among the threats identified were men with AK-47s firing on the 
convoy, as well as approaching vehicles that appeared to be suicide car 
bombers.”33  
Eyewitnesses painted a different picture. “It was one-sided shooting 
from one direction,” Waso said. “There wasn’t any return fire.”34 Waso 
and other witnesses allege that contractors fired indiscriminately and 
continued firing long after it was clear that there was no resistance—
even firing at vehicles trying to flee the square. “I call it a massacre,” 
Waso said. “It is illegal. They used the law of the jungle.”35 
Military investigators agreed,36 finding no evidence that the 
Blackwater contractors were threatened.37 “It was obviously excessive, 
it was obviously wrong,” said an anonymous U.S. military official. 
“The civilians that were fired upon, they didn’t have any weapons to 
fire back at them.”38 An independent investigation by the FBI concluded 
likewise.39 In fact, to military officials, this was a clear-cut case. “If our 
people had done this, they would be court-martialed,” said a U.S. 
military official.40 Instead, U.S. authorities, both civilian and military, 
did nothing,41 which raises the question: Given the 2006 amendment to 
10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10), why didn’t the military prosecute those 
involved?  
 
                                                                                                                     
A1. 
 31. Id.  
 32. Sudarsan Raghavan et al., Blackwater Faulted in Military Reports from Shooting 
Scene, WASH. POST., Oct. 5, 2007, at A1. Portions of the remarks were left out of Prince’s 
testimony after the Justice Department warned that the incident was under investigation and 
should not be discussed in public session. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Glanz, supra note 30. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Raghavan et al., supra note 32. 
 37. Military investigators found only cartridges and casings corresponding to contractor 
weapons. Glanz, supra note 30. 
 38. Raghavan et al., supra note 32. 
 39. Wilber & DeYoung, supra note 10. 
 40. Glanz, supra note 30. 
 41. Scahill, supra note 6. But see Del Quentin Wilber & Julie Tate, Contractors’ 
Attorneys Lash Out at Justice Department, WASH. POST., Dec. 7, 2008, at A2 (detailing how six 
Blackwater contractors involved in the Nisoor Square incident have been indicted under the 
Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act).  
5
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The simple answer is that the military had not yet decided how to 
exercise its newfound authority. As previously discussed, even though 
Congress amended 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10) in 2006, the military waited 
until March of 2008 to determine how, or if, it would exercise its 
newfound power,”42—effectively expanding the duration of the 
jurisdictional gap enjoyed by civilian contractors by an additional 
seventeen months.43 Arguably, this delay might have lingered had the 
actions taken by the contractors at Nisoor Square44 represented a rare 
and isolated occurrence. However, such abuses by civilian contractors 
had become less the exception, and more the rule.45  
A memorandum prepared for members of the House of 
Representatives’ Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 
found, according to reports obtained from Blackwater, that the company 
was involved in 195 “escalation of force” incidents from 2005 through 
2006.46 These reported incidents included the Nasoor incident,47 the 
shooting of Iraqi Vice President Adil Abd-al-Mahdi’s bodyguard by a 
drunken Blackwater contractor on Christmas Eve,48 and miscellaneous 
acts of what could best be described as wanton and reckless acts of 
violence.49  
Perhaps more disturbing, these incidents represent just those 
reported by Blackwater itself.50 The Iraqi government has accused 
Blackwater security contractors of causing far more incidents and 
demanded that the company be excluded from the region.51 
Additionally, Iraqis are not alone in their assessment of some private 
contractors’ actions.52 During an October 2007 hearing on Blackwater, 
                                                                                                                     
 42. Gates Memorandum, supra note 18, at 1–3. 
 43. Id. at 1–2. 
 44. See supra notes 29–40 and accompanying text. 
 45. See Jonathan Finer, Security Contractors In Iraq under Scrutiny after Shootings, 
WASH. POST., Sept. 10, 2005, at A1 (detailing investigation of contractors for indiscriminately 
shooting at civilians and civilian vehicles while driving through the streets of Iraq); David 
Washburn & Bruce Bigelow, Civilian Contractors Suspected in Abuses in Legal Gray Area, 
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., May 29, 2004, at A1 (examining legal ramifications for civilian 
contractors involved in prisoner abuses that took place at the Abu Ghraib military prison in 
Iraq); Jamie Wilson, Marines ‘Beat U.S. Workers’ in Iraq, GUARDIAN (London), June 9, 2005, at 
15 (describing response of U.S. marines to private security contractors allegedly shooting at a 
Marine convoy, as well as indiscriminately shooting at Iraqi civilians). 
 46. Majority Staff Memorandum, supra note 29, at 1. 
 47. See supra notes 29–40 and accompanying text. The Nasoor incident actually took 
place in 2007.  
 48. Majority Staff Memorandum, supra note 29, at 9–12. 
 49. Id. at 1–2, 6–9. 
 50. Id. at 1–2. 
 51. Andrew E. Kramer, Security Contractors Shoot at Taxi, Wounding 3 Iraqis, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 19, 2007, at A12. 
 52. See generally Hearing on Blackwater USA Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and 
Gov’t Reform, 110th Cong. 42–43 (2007) [hereinafter Hearing] (questioning Blackwater CEO 
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Representative Henry Waxman, chairman of the Committee on 
Oversight and Government Reform, noted that military commanders 
had stated publicly that Blackwater contractors “often act like 
cowboys.”53 According to the committee, senior military officials had 
“asserted that the impact of Blackwater’s actions on Iraqi attitudes 
toward U.S. forces ‘is going to hurt us badly’ and ‘may be worse than 
Abu Ghraib.’”54 
Notably, though Blackwater contractors were the focus of the 
congressional inquiry,55 they are not the sole culprits of alleged 
misconduct.56 Similar charges of criminal conduct have been levied 
against employees of many private contractor companies operating in 
Iraq.57 Still, while such abuses have colored the world’s perception of 
the entire civilian contractor population, they truly cannot be considered 
systemic.   
Of the estimated 180,000 civilian contractors working in Iraq,58 
allegations and reports of abuses almost entirely can be attributed to a 
fractional subset—private security contractors. Tasked with providing 
personal security details for high ranking officials or with protecting 
contractors not deployed directly with the combat force,59 these individuals 
often have extensive military backgrounds and are generally heavily 
armed.60 Many reportedly carry rocket and grenade launchers, in 
addition to automatic weapons,61 and some apparently have access to 
chemical riot control agents that even U.S. soldiers are prohibited from 
using.62 It is against this small subset, which accounts for no more than 
an estimated 30,000 of the contractors in Iraq,63 that nearly all 
complaints of contractor abuses have been lodged. 
Still, prior to Ali, not a single security contractor had been 
prosecuted or punished for criminal conduct in Iraq.64 As described by 
                                                                                                                     
Erik Prince about allegations of misconduct by Blackwater contractors in Iraq). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Majority Staff Memorandum, supra note 29, at 6. 
 55. See generally Hearing, supra note 52, at 42–43. 
 56. ELSEA &  SERAFINO, supra note 17, at 10–11. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Jeremy Scahill, A Very Private War, GUARDIAN (London), Aug. 1, 2007, at 4. 
 59. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 6, at 13. 
 60. Id. at 15. 
 61. See Joshua Partlow & Sudarsan Raghavan, Iraq Probe of U.S. Security Firm Grows; 
Blackwater, Accused of Killing 11 on Sunday, Cited in Earlier Deaths, WASH. POST, Sept. 22, 
2007, at A1.  
 62. James Risen, ‘05 Use of Gas by Blackwater Leaves Questions, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 
2008, at A1. 
 63. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 6, at 15. 
 64. ELSEA &  SERAFINO, supra note 17, at 20; William C. Peters, On Laws, Wars, and 
Mercenaries: The Case for Courts-Martial Jurisdiction over Civilian Contractor Misconduct in 
Iraq, 2006 BYU L. REV. 367, 367. 
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Professor William C. Peters of the United States Military Academy at 
West Point, this meant one of two things: “Either every [contractor] 
happens to be a model citizen, or there [were] serious shortcomings in 
the legal system that governs them.”65 Given the “cowboy” reputation 
earned by many contractors, the answer was clearly the latter.  
III.   CONGRESSIONAL ATTEMPTS TO REIGN IN COWBOY 
CONTRACTORS 
Frustrated by the apparent lawlessness of some security contractors 
and the apparent exasperation of many military officials, Congress 
invariably sought to halt further abuses, or at least provide an avenue of 
accountability, by closing the jurisdictional gap.66 Giving the military 
jurisdiction was not its first choice.67 Rather, Congress first attempted a 
less controversial approach—expanding the jurisdiction of U.S. federal 
courts to allow criminal contractors to be prosecuted in the United 
States.68 In theory, tailoring legislation to allow civil jurisdiction should 
have been easy. In practice, it was a dismal failure and precipitated the 
need for more effective action, which eventually came in the form of 
expanded military jurisdiction. 
It is important to note that at the time the contractor abuses in Iraq 
first came to light, legislation expanding federal court jurisdiction to 
felonies committed outside the United States was already in effect.69 
During the Clinton Administration, Congress passed the Military 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000 (MEJA)70 to address the 
longstanding problem of the immunity from prosecution of which 
civilian contractors and other civilians accompanying the military 
abroad had taken advantage.71 Ostensibly, MEJA, as originally enacted, 
gave federal courts criminal jurisdiction over members of the Armed 
Forces and individuals “employed by or accompanying the Armed 
Forces outside the United States.”72 Of course, the devil was in the 
details, which included language excluding most of the estimated 
                                                                                                                     
 65. Peters, supra note 64, at 367. 
 66. See supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text. 
 67. See Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-523, §§ 1–2, 
114 Stat. 2488, 2488–92 (current version at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261–67 (2004)). 
 68. Id.; see also Closing Legal Loopholes: Prosecuting Sexual Assaults and Other Violent 
Crimes Committed Overseas by American Civilians in a Combat Environment: Hearing Before 
the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 110th Cong. 2 (2008) (statement of Sigal P. Mandelker, 
Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice) [hereinafter Mandelker]. 
 69. See generally Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act §§ 1–2.  
 70. Id. 
 71. Glenn R. Schmitt, Amending the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000: 
Rushing to Close an Unforeseen Loophole, ARMY LAW., June 2005, available at 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m6052/is_2005_June/ai_n14935862. 
 72. Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act § 2.  
8
Florida Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol62/iss2/6
2010] DOES THE MILITARY NEED A FORMAL INVITATION 527 
 
30,000 private security contractors in Iraq from U.S. jurisdiction.73  
The basis for MEJA’s original shortcomings can be broadly 
delineated into two categories: citizenship or status. Concerning 
citizenship, MEJA excludes nearly all foreign nationals—nearly 25,000 
individuals—from its jurisdiction.74 Based on that limitation alone, the 
scope of MEJA’s applicability shrinks considerably—remaining only 
applicable to an estimated 5,000 security contractors.75 Arguably, 
though, this is not the source of MEJA’s failures. In truth, the exempted 
foreign nationals were never the target of congressional action for one 
simple reason—foreign nationals were subject to prosecution by their 
respective governments.76  
In contrast, the pertinent status limitation had a much more insidious 
effect. By narrowly defining those “employed by or accompanying the 
Armed Forces” to include only contractors or employees of the 
Department of Defense (as well as military dependants residing with 
their military member),77 MEJA rendered itself toothless. Of the 
remaining 5,000 security contractors, the majority—including 
Blackwater contractors and the rest of the most notorious cowboys—
worked for the Department of State,78 which exempted them from 
MEJA jurisdiction.79 Most of the remaining contractors were employed 
by a variety of government agencies and were likewise exempt.80 In 
reality, few security contractors were employed by the Department of 
Defense.81 Thus, though intended to bring law to the lawless, MEJA, as 
originally enacted, effectively made little difference. It could not bring 
private security contractors to justice.  
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 73. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 6, at 15. 
 74. First, MEJA, as originally enacted, explicitly excluded from U.S. jurisdiction any 
citizen of the country in which the crime was committed. Mandelker, supra note 68, at 2. In 
Iraq, half of all security contractors are Iraqi nationals. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra 
note 6, at 15. Second, MEJA, as originally enacted, did not extend U.S. jurisdiction to foreign 
nationals subject to prosecution in their own countries. Mandelker, supra note 68, at 2. As 
tabulated by the Congressional Budget Office, this potentially excludes another 10,000 security 
contractors from prosecution. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 6, at 15. 
 75. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 6, at 15. 
 76. Mandelker, supra note 68, at 2. 
 77. Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act §§ 1–2; Mandelker, supra note 68, at 2; 
Schmitt, supra note 71. 
 78. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 6, at 16; ELSEA &  SERAFINO, supra note 
17, at 6–7. 
 79. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 6, at 24. 
 80. ELSEA &  SERAFINO, supra note 17, at 7–9. Notably, contractors involved in the Abu 
Ghraib incident worked for the CIA and the Department of the Interior and were thus immune 
from prosecution under MEJA. Schmitt, supra note 71. 
 81. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 6, at 15. 
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In light of that fact, in 2004, members of Congress acted to free 
MEJA from some of its limitations.82 While retaining MEJA’s 
exemptions for foreign nationals,83 Congress expanded MEJA’s 
definition of non-military individuals to include contractors employed 
by “any other Federal agency, or any provisional authority, to the extent 
such employment relates to supporting the mission of the Department of 
Defense overseas . . . .”84 Unfortunately, the clarity of MEJA’s 
applicability would have been better served if Congress had taken more 
time debating and drafting the amendment.85 While clearly broader in 
applicability, the new language leaves much to be desired in clearly 
delineating to whom MEJA now applies.86 Many authorities have 
concluded that contractors employed by the State Department remain 
exempt from U.S. jurisdiction,87 a conclusion seemingly supported by 
the paucity of prosecutions brought under MEJA.88 As explained by 
Peter Singer, a Brookings Institute scholar, by 2005 “[t]here ha[d] been 
more than 20,000 [security contractors] on the ground in Iraq for more 
than two years and not one has been prosecuted for anything . . . . Given 
the raw number of contractors, let alone the incidents we know about, it 
boggles the mind.”89  
As a result of MEJA’s shortcomings, members of Congress sought 
yet another method of curbing contractor abuses—the 2006 amendment 
to 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10).90 The statute subjects arguably all civilians—
contractors, military dependants, and even embedded journalists—to 
military trials for offenses committed near a conflict zone.91 Supporters 
stated that its implementation would raise troop morale and aid the 
military by bringing “uniformity to the commander’s ability to control 
the behavior of people representing [the United States].”92 
                                                                                                                     
 82. Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub. L. 
No. 108-375, § 1088, 118 Stat. 1811, 2066–67 (2004); Mandelker, supra note 68, at 2. 
 83. See Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act § 1088. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 6, at 23. Through March 2008, only 
thirteen cases had been charged—all of which were referred by the Department of Defense. Id. 
None dealt with the kind of abuses discussed in this Note. Se  Mandelker, supra note 68, at 3 
(describing how most successful prosecutions have dealt with allegations of sexual abuse); 
ELSEA &  SERAFINO, supra note 17, at 19 (discussing prosecution for child pornography); Tony 
Perry, Marine Is Acquitted in Killings of 4 Iraqis, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2008, at A1 (discussing 
prosecution of Marine reservist for killing Iraqi prisoners).  
 88. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 6, at 24.  
 89. Witte, supra note 12. 
 90. John Warner National Defense Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-364, § 552, 
120 Stat. 2083, 2217 (2006). 
 91. Witte, supra note 12. 
 92. Id.  
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Still, given its scope and potential impact, it is somewhat surprising 
that the amendment was not opposed while being considered by 
Congress and received little original fanfare after being signed into 
law.93 This may be because this massive change in policy was 
effectuated by adding just five words to the massive John Warner 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007.94 Regardless, 
once people became aware of the change, it set the legal community and 
the contractor community ablaze.95 Expressing doubt as to the 
constitutionality of such jurisdiction,96 critics alleged that the 
amendment was effectively snuck into law97 and charge that it gives 
military commanders too much power.98 Some feel the military itself 
was apprehensive about the change,99 which precipitated the seventeen 
months delay in its effectuation.100 Of course, while the government is 
currently content in its employment of amended 10 U.S.C. 
§ 802(a)(10),101 it remains to be seen whether the amendment itself will 
ultimately be successful. If it survives constitutional challenge, it may 
serve as the perfect tool to curb future contractor abuses. If it does not, 
Congress might be forced to further revise MEJA, an undertaking some 
members have already attempted.102  
                                                                                                                     
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. See supra notes 13–14, 21–22 and accompanying text.  
 97. Witte, supra note 12. “This is a provision that has dramatic impact and deserved far 
more discussion than it got,” said Stan Soloway, president of the Professional Services Council, 
a trade group that represents civilian contractors. Id. 
 98. Id. “This looks good on the surface, but it creates far more problems than it solves,” 
said Stan Soloway. Id. “One could imagine a situation in which a commander is unhappy with 
what a reporter is writing and could use the [Uniform Code of Military Justice] to pressure the 
reporter,” said Phillip E. Carter, a contracting lawyer with McKenna Long & Aldridge. I . 
 99. Robert E. Reed, Assoc. Deputy Gen. Counsel, Nat’l Def. Indus. Ass’n (Procurement 
Div.), UCMJ Civilian Jurisdiction, Powerpoint presentation on UCMJ Civilian Jurisdiction 
(Nov. 15, 2007), available at meetings.abanet.org/webupload/commupload/PC704400/sitesofint 
erest_files/UCMJ_Developments_in_UCMJ_Jurisdiction_Art_2(a)(10)_for_NDIA_Procuremen
t_Division_Nov_15_2007.ppt. 
 100. Gates Memorandum, supra note 18, at 1–3. 
 101. See Press Release, Multi-National Force-Iraq, supra note 23 (referencing the 
successful prosecution of Ali). 
 102. A proposed amendment would have expand jurisdiction under MEJA to any 
contractor working for any department or agency of the United States in any area where the U.S. 
military is conducting a contingency operation. H.R. 2740, 110th Cong. § 2 (2007). Speaking on 
the floor of the House of Representatives, Representative John Hall stressed the importance of 
the bill to “bringing previously unaccountable private security contractors under the rule of U.S. 
law.” 153 CONG. REC. H11262 (2007), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getpage.cgi?position=all&page=H11262&dbname=2007_record (statement of Rep. Hall). 
He then described how without it, contractors like those working for Blackwater, one of many 
private security companies employed by the State Department, could otherwise operate with 
impunity. Id. On October 4, 2007, the bill was passed by House of Representatives but was 
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IV.   JUDICIAL PRECEDENT: THE LIMITS ON M ILITARY JURISDICTION 
Quite simply, this is not the first time the government has sought to 
subject civilians to the jurisdiction of the military.103 It would also not 
be the first time such an expansion was held unconstitutional.104  
The problem of expanded military jurisdiction can best be 
characterized as a problem of in personam jurisdiction.105 As a 
foundational matter, military jurisdiction is derived from Article I, § 8, 
Clause 14,106 which allows Congress “[t]o make Rules for the 
Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.”107 Based on 
this language, the Supreme Court has found that no subject-matter 
limitation exists as to the category of offenses that can properly be 
subject to military jurisdiction.108 In contrast, however, the Court has 
determined that Congress’ ability to subject individuals to military 
jurisdiction is strictly limited.109 Generally, the determination as to 
whether a military court has in personam jurisdiction over an individual 
depends exclusively on the “military status of the accused.”110 
Importantly, however, the rule is not absolute. Under extremely 
limited circumstances attendant to war, the Court has held that the in 
personam jurisdiction of military courts can constitutionally expand to 
include civilians.111 Critically, 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10) must fall within 
the strict limits of this exception in order to be constitutional. As such, 
                                                                                                                     
never voted upon by the Senate. GovTrack.us, H.R. 2740: MEJA Expansion and Enforcement 
Act of 2007, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h110-2740 (last visited Jan. 28, 
2010). 
 103. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 595 (2006), superseded by statute, Military 
Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No 109-366, § 7, 120 Stat. 2600, 2635–36. However, the 
relevant provisions of the Military Commissions Act have since been found unconstitutional by 
Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2274 (2008). For additional cases regarding the 
subjection of civilians to military jurisdiction, see Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (plurality 
opinion) (rejecting exercise of military jurisdiction over civilian); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 
Wall.) 2 (1866) (rejecting exercise of military jurisdiction over civilian). 
 104. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 595; Reid, 354 U.S. at 41; Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. at 121. 
 105. See United States v. Hart, 66 M.J. 273, 275 (C.A.A.F. 2008) (determining Air Force 
had in personam jurisdiction over a serviceman). 
 106. See generally Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 439 (1987) (holding that 
Constitution conditions the jurisdiction of military courts on the “military status of the 
accused”). 
 107. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14. 
 108. Stephen I. Vladeck, On Jurisdictional Elephants and Kangaroo Courts, 103 NW. U. L. 
REV. (COLLOQUY) 172, 174 (2008) (citing O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 272–73 (1965)); 
Solorio, 483 U.S. at 440). 
 109. Id.  
 110. Solorio, 483 U.S. at 439 (citations omitted). 
 111. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1957) (plurality opinion); Ex parte Milligan, 
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 131 (1866) (holding that the extension of military jurisdiction to Lambdin 
P. Milligan, charged with planning to steal Union weapons and invade Union prisoner-of-war 
camps during the Civil War, was unconstitutional given the presence of open civilian courts). 
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one must analyze precedent to determine the boundaries of the 
exception and to ascertain whether a formally declared war is requisite 
to extending military jurisdiction to civilians. This Part will therefore 
group and analyze precedent in three broad categories: the historical 
limitations on the application of military jurisdiction to civilians, Reid v. 
Covert112 and its progeny’s effect on the limits on military jurisdiction, 
and the impact of recent decisions on the permissible reach of military 
jurisdiction.  
A.  Historical Limitations on Application of Military Jurisdiction to 
Civilians 
As early as 1866, in Ex parte Milligan, the Supreme Court 
articulated the general understanding that military jurisdiction was only 
appropriate in two limited circumstances: the trial of members of the 
military and the trial of civilians in times of war.113 Regarding the first, 
the Court did not question the military’s exercise of jurisdiction over its 
own members.114 Instead, the Court explained that the Constitution 
“empower[ed] Congress  ‘to make rules for the government and 
regulation of the land and naval forces,’”115 and approved Congress’ 
designation of authority to the military to subject military members to 
military trial.116 In contrast, the Court was quite hostile to the 
application of military jurisdiction to civilians117 and allowed such only 
in extremely narrow circumstances attendant to times of war.118 The 
Court was emphatic that even under the “‘laws and usages of war’”119 
military jurisdiction could “never be applied to citizens in states which 
have upheld the authority of the government, and where the courts are 
open and their process unobstructed.”120 The fact that the country at 
large was engaged in active domestic combat did not on its own 
suffice;121 the fighting had to be particular to the area of the offense and 
to the extent that civil authority had been rendered incapable of 
exercising criminal jurisdiction.122  
 
                                                                                                                     
 112. 354 U.S. 1 (1957). 
 113. 71 U.S. at 119–26. 
 114. Id. at 121–26. 
 115. Id. at 35. 
 116. Id. at 123–24. 
 117. Id. at 118–19 (“No graver question was ever considered by this court, nor one which 
more nearly concerns the rights of the whole people; for it is the birthright of every American 
citizen when charged with crime, to be tried and punished according to law.”). 
 118. Id. at 121–22. 
 119. Id. at 121. 
 120. Id.  
 121. See id. at 121–22. 
 122. Id. at 122. 
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As a result, the Court rejected the exercise of military jurisdiction 
over Milligan, who had been arrested by military authorities and 
accused of plotting to free Confederate prisoners held in Indiana during 
the Civil War.123 In making its determination, the Court stated a maxim 
that bears careful consideration in resolving the matter at hand. 
The power of punishment is, alone through the means 
which the laws have provided for that purpose, and if they 
are ineffectual, there is an immunity from punishment, no 
matter how great an offender the individual may be, or how 
much his crimes may have shocked the sense of justice of 
the country, or endangered its safety. By the protection of 
the law human rights are secured; withdraw that protection, 
and they are at the mercy of wicked rulers[,] or the clamor 
of an excited people.124 
In short, regardless of the policy implications or perceived needs of 
the military,125 the Court cautioned that the country would be better 
served by allowing transgressors immunity from prosecution, rather 
than trouncing the fundamental safeguards of the Constitution.126 The 
Court thereafter articulated that the determinate issue in such cases is 
whether the military had “in it jurisdiction, legally, to try and sentence” 
the civilian at issue.127  
Notably, during the Court’s entire analysis of the factors necessary 
before military jurisdiction could be applied to civilians, the Court never 
                                                                                                                     
 123. Id. at 121–22; see also Peters, supra note 64, at 401–02. 
 124. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. at 119. 
 125. Such language discounts any importance the “military deference doctrine” plays in the 
resolution of jurisdictional issues, and recent decisions reaffirm the Supreme Court’s hostility to 
the doctrine in such matters. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008); Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006), superseded by statute, Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. 
L. No 109-366, § 7, 120 Stat. 2600, 2635–36. However, the relevant provisions of the Military 
Commissions Act have since been found unconstitutional by the Court in Boumediene v. Bush, 
128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). The military deference doctrine is the term given to describe the Court’s 
clear inclination to defer to the assertions and opinions of the military when resolving 
constitutional challenges to military action. See generally Steven B. Lichtman, The Justices and 
the Generals: A Critical Examination of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Tradition of Deference to the 
Military, 1918-2004, 65 MD. L. REV. 907, 915 (2006) (discussing the Court’s tradition of 
deference to the military).  
 126. The Court found that the military trial of an American citizen implicated the 
constitutional guarantee to trial of all crimes by jury; his Fourth Amendment right to be secure 
against seizure without proof of probable cause; his Fifth Amendment right not to be held to 
answer for a capital crime without presentment by a grand jury; and his Sixth Amendment right 
to “trial by jury, in such manner and with such regulations that with upright judges, impartial 
juries, and an able bar, the innocent will be saved and the guilty punished.” Ex parte Milligan, 
71 U.S. at 119–20. 
 127. Id. at 118. 
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detailed or even hinted at a requirement that a formal declaration of war 
be in effect.128 Certainly, the government made no formal declaration of 
war during the Civil War, though it is arguable that the Court may have 
concluded that a declaration was immaterial given the presence of open 
and available courts. However, it seems more likely that the Court did 
not contemplate an actual declaration of war to be necessary. This 
proposition is supported by the Court’s discussion contrasting the 
appropriateness of military jurisdiction in the states of Indiana and 
Virginia during the Civil War.129 Though rejecting the application of 
military law to citizens in Indiana, the Court pointed out that military 
justice would be appropriate in Virginia, as it was “the locality of actual 
war” where “the national authority was overturned and the courts driven 
out.”130 Certainly this could not be the case if the Court assumed that a 
formal declaration of war was necessary. Milligan therefore seemingly 
endorses the principle that the dispositive factor for military jurisdiction 
over civilians is not a formal declaration of war, but rather the existence 
of actual hostilities that precludes the exercise of civil jurisdiction (a 
situation this Note will refer to as “military necessity”). 
The Court affirmed and strengthened this principle of military 
necessity eighty years later in the case of Duncan v. Kahanamoku.131 
Though Congress had formally declared war against Japan in 1941 and 
Hawaii had been placed under martial law and had its courts suspended, 
the Court found the military trial of civilians in Hawaii to be 
unconstitutional.132 Citing Milligan, the concurring Justice found the 
mere threat of invasion insufficient to allow the military to supplant 
civilian jurisdiction.133 Consequently, even though the military had 
closed the courts, the military trial of civilians was inappropriate 
because the closure was not precipitated by true military necessity.134 
The concurrence concluded that civilian courts must be “utterly 
incapable of trying criminals or of dispensing justice . . . before the Bill 
of Rights may be temporarily suspended.”135 Importantly, the Court 
differentiated the circumstances in Duncan from cases in which 
civilians were tried by military courts established in an occupied 
                                                                                                                     
 128. See id. at 121. 
 129. Id. at 127. 
 130. Id.  
 131. 327 U.S. 304, 330 (1946). 
 132. Id. at 324; see also id. at 324–25 (Murphy, J., concurring). 
 133. Id. at 330 (Murphy, J., concurring) (“‘Martial law (in relation to closing the courts) 
cannot arise from a threatened invasion. The necessity must be actual and present; the invasion 
real, such as effectually closes the courts and deposes the civil administration.’” (quoting Ex 
parte Milligan, 71 U.S. at 127)). 
 134. Id. at 311–12 (majority opinion). 
 135. Id. at 330 (Murphy, J., concurring). 
15
Healy: The Constitutionality of Amended 10 U.S.C. Sec. 802(a)(10): Does
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2010
534 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
 
territory by a temporary military government.136 In those cases, the 
Court had previously concluded, and now reaffirmed, that the military 
acted within its recognized power.137  
Thus, in the case of Madsen v. Kinsella,138 the petitioner Yvette 
Madsen did not even attempt to dispute her amenability to military 
jurisdiction in general.139 Madsen, an American citizen accused of 
murdering her husband while accompanying him in occupied Germany 
following World War II,140 instead contended that because she was 
within the class of individuals statutorily subject to trial by military 
court-martial, she was not subject to the jurisdiction of the military 
commission established in that area by military authority.141 Rejecting 
her argument, the Court found the jurisdiction of the court-martial and 
the military commission to be concurrent142 and stated that the need for 
military commissions only arises because of statutory limitations on the 
jurisdiction of court-martial courts.143 If Congress so desired, it would 
be constitutionally permissible to broaden court-martial jurisdiction to 
the limits set by the Court for commission jurisdiction.144 Therefore, 
either form of military jurisdiction could appropriately be extended to 
civilians in any area in which the civil authority has been displaced by 
warfare.145 Furthermore, once applied under such circumstances, the 
duration of military jurisdiction did not necessarily expire upon the 
cessation of hostilities or even upon the formal signing of a peace 
treaty.146 Rather, the Court indicated that such jurisdiction can 
appropriately be exercised until such time as the military is able to fully 
discharge its responsibilities.147 Notably, at the time of Madsen’s 
military trial, German civil courts had been reopened;148 however, 
Madsen was immune from trial in such courts by mandate of the U.S. 
government.149  
                                                                                                                     
 136. Id. at 314 (majority opinion). 
 137. Id. 
 138. 343 U.S. 341 (1952). 
 139. Id. at 345. 
 140. Id. at 343–44. 
 141. Id. at 360–61. The commission was created under military authority and given 
jurisdiction over all criminal cases in that area not involving members of the U.S. military. Id.  
 142. Id. at 354. 
 143. Id. at 347–48. “The occasion for military commission arises principally from the fact 
that the jurisdiction of the court-martial proper, in our law, is restricted by statute almost 
exclusively to members of the military force and to certain specific offenses defined in the 
written code.” Id. at 346 n.8. 
 144. Id. at 348–49. 
 145. See id. at 354; Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 121–22 (1866). 
 146. Madsen, 343 U.S. at 360. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 361–62. 
 149. Id. at 362. 
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In addition to defining the scope of military jurisdiction, the Court 
also shed light on whether a formal declaration of war was necessary to 
support military jurisdiction. Delineating the historical jurisdiction of 
the various forms of military trials, the Court described the role of 
military commissions during the United States’ second intervention in 
Cuba,150 in which the United States used a military commission to try 
two men accused of murder during the intervention though “the 
condition was not war” (in reference to the fact that no formal 
declaration of war was made).151 The Court concluded that such 
jurisdiction was nevertheless authorized by the law of war, and that trial 
by courts-martial was inappropriate only because of statutory 
restrictions.152  
In summation, historical military jurisdiction may be considered 
constitutionally appropriate in only two circumstances: when applied to 
members of the military and when applied to civilians during times in 
which civilian courts were rendered incapable of exercising jurisdiction 
due to actual regional conflict.153 The Court has restricted the 
circumstances of that necessity to times of actual invasion154 r warfare 
that rendered the civilian courts incapable of exercising criminal 
jurisdiction.155 Importantly, it was these actual conditions, and not the 
formal declaration of war, which gave rise to the constitutional exercise 
of military jurisdiction over civilians.156 Additionally, once that 
necessity arose, the duration of the military’s jurisdiction was quite 
broad, allowing the use of military commissions, at least in foreign 
territory,157 until such time as the military was able to complete its 
mission in that area.158  
B.  The Limits of Reid v. Covert and its Progeny 
Largely regarded as the basis for limiting military jurisdiction over 
civilians, Reid v. Covert159 is one of the seminal cases dealing with 
military jurisdiction. While Reid is extraordinary in that the Court 
decided to rehear and reverse two consolidated cases decided in just the 
previous term,160 it is far from extraordinary in terms of defining the 
                                                                                                                     
 150. Id. at 354 n.20. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 354–55. 
 153. See Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 311–12 (1946); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 
(4 Wall.) 2, 127 (1866).  
 154. Duncan, 327 U.S. at 330.  
 155. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. at 121. 
 156. Id. at 127; Madsen, 343 U.S. at 353 n.20. 
 157. Madsen, 343 U.S. at 361–62. 
 158. Id. at 360. 
 159. 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (plurality opinion). 
 160. Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470 (1956), overruled by Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5 
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limits of military jurisdiction as applied to civilians. In effect, the Court 
merely rebuffed efforts to extend military jurisdiction (though this time 
under the context of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)) 
beyond its traditional bounds and held that military jurisdiction was 
only appropriate over those actually in the military or over civilians 
during limited times of war and military necessity.161 
From its inception, it is clear that the UCMJ was intended by 
Congress to subject civilians to the jurisdiction of military justice. 
Section 2(10) of 50 U.S.C. § 552 provided that “[i]n time of war, all 
persons serving with or accompanying an armed force in the field” were 
subject to the UCMJ.162 Even broader, Section 2(11) of 50 U.S.C. § 552 
stated that “[s]ubject to the provisions of any treaty or agreement to 
which the United States is or may be a party or to any accepted rule of 
international law, all persons serving with, employed by, or 
accompanying the armed forces without the continental limits of the 
United States” are subject to the jurisdiction of the Code.163 For its part, 
the military was not shy in effectuating that intent.164 In the five years 
following passage of the statute, the Army alone tried 2,280 civilians by 
courts-martial.165 Of course, though intended and perhaps even useful, 
the question remained: Was the expanded jurisdiction constitutional? 
The question did not linger unanswered for long. In Reid, the Court 
considered the constitutionality of trying, pursuant to Section 2(11) of 
50 U.S.C. § 552, two military dependants for crimes committed 
overseas while accompanying their respective military husbands.166 
Distinguishing the case from Madsen,167 the Court cited the restrictions 
articulated nearly a century before in Milligan and held that military 
jurisdiction was only appropriate in times of peace if exercised over 
members of the military itself.168 Regarding civilians, military 
jurisdiction passed constitutional muster only if applied to civilians 
located in an area of actual hostilities during times of military 
necessity.169 Determining that the dependants at issue fit neither 
category, the Court concluded that the military’s exercise of jurisdiction 
over these civilians was inappropriate.170  
                                                                                                                     
(1957). 
 161. See Reid, 354 U.S. at 20–23, 30–31. 
 162. 50 U.S.C. § 552(10) (1952) (current version at 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10) (2006)). 
 163. 50 U.S.C. § 552(11) (1952) (current version at 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(11) (2006)). 
 164. See Krueger, 351 U.S. at 477. 
 165. Id. at 477 n.7. 
 166. Reid, 354 U.S. at 3–4. 
 167. Id. at 35. 
 168. Id. at 19–20, 30–31. 
 169. Id. at 30–31. 
 170. Id. at 41. 
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Notably, Reid was determined by plurality opinion.171 Three Justices 
joined in the opinion of Justice Black and rejected any application of 
military jurisdiction to civilians in a time of peace.172 Justices 
Frankfurter and Harlan concurred only in the result, concluding that 
military jurisdiction might be appropriate in non-capital cases in times 
of peace173 (an idea resoundingly rejected shortly thereafter).174 
Certainly, though, the Court’s holding in Reid should not be discounted 
because it was decided by plurality.175 Justice Black’s opinion primarily 
relied on established historical precedent. In truth, Reid made no novel 
assertions regarding the appropriate boundaries of military jurisdiction, 
other than stating that “there might be circumstances where a person 
could be ‘in’ the armed services for purposes of [Congress’ power to 
make rules and regulations of the land and naval forces] even though he 
had not formally been inducted into the military or did not wear a 
uniform.”176 Declining to define who might thus be included, the Court 
merely stated that military dependants were not.177  
Additionally, any doubt as to Reid’s holding can effectively be 
dismissed in light of Reid’s progeny, which collectively affirmed and 
extended the principles espoused by Justice Black.178 First, the Court 
held conclusively in Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton that 
military dependants were not “in” the military, and thus could only be 
subjected to military jurisdiction in times of war, regardless of the 
offense charged.179 Next, the Court in McElroy v. United States ex rel. 
Guagliardo extended that principle to civilian employees of the 
military.180 Rejecting the reasoning of the United States Court of 
Military Appeals (USCMA)181 in United States v. Wilson,182 the Court 
                                                                                                                     
 171. See generally id. 
 172. Id. at 1, 40–41. 
 173. See id. at 41–64 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at 65–78 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 174. See McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281, 283–84 (1960); 
Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278, 278–80 (1960); Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 
361 U.S. 234, 249 (1960). 
 175. The dissent is not to be based on the idea that military jurisdiction over civilians was 
appropriate in peacetime, but rather that the women at issue satisfied the tests espoused by the 
plurality opinion, i.e., that they either committed their crimes in a conflict zone or fit into the 
majority’s expanded category of those considered “in” the military. See Reid, 354 U.S. at 78–90 
(Clark, J., dissenting). 
 176. Id. at 22–23 (plurality opinion). 
 177. Id. at 22–23. 
 178. See Guagliardo, 361 U.S. at 286–87; Grisham, 361 U.S. at 278–80; Singleton, 361 
U.S. at 249. 
 179. 361 U.S. 234, 249 (1960) (affirming that military dependants cannot be considered to 
be “in” the military and therefore cannot be subject to military jurisdiction in times of peace 
regardless of whether the crime is of a capital nature or not). 
 180. See 361 U.S. 281, 286–87 (1960); Grisham, 361 U.S. at 278–80. 
 181. The United States Court of Military Appeals was re-designated the United States 
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held that one’s status, either civilian or service member, was 
determinate.183 An individual’s contact or relationship with the 
military—no matter how extensive—was insufficient to subject that 
person to military jurisdiction in times of peace.184 Thus, a civilian 
employee would have to voluntarily enlist into the military before that 
individual could constitutionally be subject to military jurisdiction in 
times of peace.185  
It should also be noted that Reid and its progeny all dealt with 
challenges to jurisdiction brought pursuant to Article 2(11), which 
purported to extend military jurisdiction to civilians accompanying the 
armed forces outside the context of war.186 In accord with precedent, the 
Court struck down attempts to use such jurisdiction on the basis that 
civilians were only amenable to military jurisdiction in circumstances of 
military necessity attendant to war. In contrast, the Court expressed its 
favor for Article 2(10), stating in dicta “that Art[icle] 2(10) sets forth 
the maximum historically recognized extent of military jurisdiction over 
civilians under the concept of ‘in the field.’”187 As Article 2(10) was 
eventually re-codified as 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10), the statute presently at 
issue, the Court’s understanding of the word “war” is of crucial 
importance in determining whether the amended statute remains 
constitutionally valid.  
As is often the case, the Court does not help matters by providing a 
precise definition.188 Still, the Court’s discussion clearly demonstrates 
that actual conflict, and not a formal declaration of war, is the proper 
keystone. As in Milligan, the Court makes no mention of the need for a 
formal declaration of war.189 Rather, the Court states that “[f]rom a time 
prior to the adoption of the Constitution the extraordinary circumstances 
present in an area of actual fighting have been considered sufficient to 
permit punishment of some civilians in that area by military courts 
under military rules.”190 Certainly, such a statement is in accord with the 
                                                                                                                     
Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces by Congress in 1994. CLERK OF THE COURT, U.S. COURT 
OF APPEALS FOR THE ARMED FORCES, THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ARMED 
FORCES, 1,3 (2006), available at http://www.armfor.uscourts.gov/CAAFBooklet2006.pdf. 
 182. United States v. Wilson, 9 C.M.A. 60 (1958), overruled by Guagliardo, 361 U.S. at 
287. 
 183. See Guagliardo, 361 U.S. at 286–87. 
 184. Id.  
 185. Id. (describing how military could follow a procedure along the lines of that provided 
for paymaster’s clerks and approved by the Court in Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13 (1879)). 
 186. See id.; Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278, 278–80 (1960); Kinsella v. United States ex 
rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 249 (1960); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 3–4 (1957). 
 187. Reid, 354 U.S. at 34 n.61. 
 188. See id. at 33–34. 
 189. Id. at 34–35. 
 190. Id. at 33. 
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argument that military jurisdiction authority arises solely out of military 
necessity and is not dependent on mere formalities.191 Seemingly then, 
by affirming the jurisdictional grant in Article 2(10), the Court endorsed 
the traditional principle that actual hostilities and the disruption of the 
civil government act as the keystone for exercising military jurisdiction 
over civilians.192  
In effect, Reid and its contemporaries did little more than maintain 
the traditional two-prong approach to military jurisdiction. The Court 
upheld the application of military jurisdiction to military members,193 
but it strictly limited such jurisdiction over civilians—requiring the 
military necessity as a result of actual conflict in the area.194 
Furthermore, after hinting that it might consider expanding the scope of 
who might be considered in the military,195 the Court actually held 
otherwise, articulating that military dependants and employees could 
never be considered in the military for the sake of jurisdiction, 
regardless of the proximity of their relationship.196 As a result, civilians 
could only be subject to military jurisdiction in times of war—a concept 
explicitly endorsed by the Court’s admonishment that Article 2(10) 
described the maximum allowable reach of military jurisdiction.197 In 
that regard, the Court clearly upheld precedent that the existence of war 
was to be determined not by formalities, but rather by the reality of 
actual conflict.198 Therefore, only in times of military necessity is 
military jurisdiction over civilians constitutionally appropriate.199  
C.  Impact of Recent Decisions on the Permissible Reach of Military 
Jurisdiction 
Given the Court’s preoccupation with Article 2(11), it might have 
seemed that Article 2(10), which codified the military’s authority to 
subject civilians serving with or accompanying it in the field in time of 
war, was settled law. However, in 1969, the USMCA, the “supreme 
court” of military law at the time,200 decided otherwise and effectively 
created the jurisdictional gap at issue when it determined in United 
States v. Averette that a formal declaration of war was necessary to 
permit the application of military jurisdiction to civilians pursuant to the 
                                                                                                                     
 191. Id. at 30–33. 
 192. Id. at 34–35. 
 193. Id. at 19–20. 
 194. Id. at 30–31, 35. 
 195. Id. at 22–23. 
 196. See McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281, 286–7 (1960); 
Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 249 (1960). 
 197. Reid, 354 U.S. at 34 n.61. 
 198. Id. at 33–34. 
 199. Id. at 30–33. 
 200. See supra note 181 and accompanying text. 
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statute.201 Since Averette, no civilian had been prosecuted under military 
jurisdiction202 until Congress’ decision to amend 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10) 
and the subsequent charging of Ali in 2008.203 Of course, given prior 
precedent, such a ruling would mark a monumental shift in reasoning if 
based on constitutional principles. It would also be an exceedingly 
strong argument for questioning amended 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10)’s 
validity. Unfortunately for cowboy contractors, the situation is not so 
bleak. 
While the Averette decision could simply be classified as an 
aberration, it certainly resulted from a confusing time in the Court’s 
treatment of military jurisdiction. While the Court in Reid had 
effectively rebuffed attempts to expand military jurisdiction beyond its 
traditional bounds,204 it took no steps to limit that jurisdiction. As stated 
previously, it effectively maintained the traditional two-prong 
approach—in which an individual’s status as a member of the military 
was the determinate factor in deciding when military jurisdiction might 
be employed outside the context of war.205 However, during the height 
of the Vietnam War, the Court made an abrupt about face.206 In 
O’Callahan v. Parker,207 the Court declared that an individual’s status 
as a military member was merely a threshold issue.208 A crime must 
additionally have been service-related to justify military jurisdiction.209 
Practically speaking, even a soldier could not be tried by the military for 
crimes committed for “peacetime offenses” in an area where “[c]ivil 
courts were open.”210 Without a doubt, this was a radical restriction on 
the exercise of military jurisdiction. Seemingly, the Court determined 
that characteristics of military necessity were required before the 
military had jurisdiction over even its own members’ crimes. 
Given the Court’s apparent desire to restrict the exercise of military 
jurisdiction, it should not come as a surprise that Averette was decided 
in a likewise restrictive manner just one year later.211 In fact, the 
USMCA specifically stated that its basis for restricting the statutory 
employment of military jurisdiction to civilians was “the most recent 
                                                                                                                     
 201. 19 C.M.A. 363 (1970) (2-1 decision). 
 202. Peters, supra note 64, at 367. 
 203. Scahill, supra note 6. 
 204. See generally Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (declining to allow the military to 
exert jurisdiction over a civilian during peace time). 
 205. Kinsella v. United States x rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 240–41 (1960). 
 206. See O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 267, 272–73 (1969), overruled by Solorio v. 
United States, 483 U.S. 435 (1987).  
 207. Id. at 258. 
 208. Id. at 267. 
 209. Id. at 272–73. 
 210. Id. at 273–74. 
 211. Peters, supra note 64, at 394–97.  
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guidance in this area from the Supreme Court.”212 Many critics of the 
Averette court’s decision point out that the USMCA could not have 
relied on precedent other than O’Callahan because none existed.213 This 
sentiment was expressed even at the time of the decision.214 I  his 
dissent to Averette, Chief Judge Quinn stated that “there is no 
compelling or cogent reason” for the manner in which the court was 
construing the phrase “time of war.”215 Importantly, though, even the 
Averette court did not hold that a formal declaration of war was 
constitutionally necessary.216 In fact, the court explicitly declined to 
make any such determination.217 Rather, the court merely interpreted the 
statutory language to require a formal declaration of war218—a point 
bitterly opposed by the dissent.219  
Thus, even under Averette, Congress could have acted to broaden the 
circumstances under which the statute authorized the exercise of 
military jurisdiction over civilians. Of course, it is arguable that the 
Averette court correctly interpreted O’Callahan as representative of the 
Court’s desire to limit all applications of military jurisdiction, and that 
given the opportunity the Court would have limited military jurisdiction 
over civilians as well. Certainly, if the trend started by O’Callahan was 
still in effect, this might bear consideration. Importantly, however, such 
is not the case; O’Callahan is no longer good law. 
In 1987, the Rehnquist Court220 overruled O’Callahan in Solorio v. 
United States and re-established the offender’s status as the sole factor 
in determining whether military jurisdiction could appropriately be 
exercised over service members.221 In returning to what might be 
considered the norm, the Court specifically cited Kinsella, Reid, and 
Milligan as demonstrative of the proper application of military 
jurisdiction.222 Notably, though Solorio’s holding was limited to the 
ability of the military to exercise jurisdiction over service members,223 
its reasoning clearly demonstrates the Court’s acknowledgement that 
the traditional norms concerning the exercise of military jurisdiction 
                                                                                                                     
 212. United States v. Averette, 19 C.M.A. 363, 365 (1970). 
 213. Peters, supra note 64, at 394–97. 
 214. Averette, 19 C.M.A. at 366 (Quinn, C.J., dissenting). 
 215. Id.  
 216. Id. at 365 (majority opinion). 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. at 366 (Quinn, C.J., dissenting). 
 220. See generally Michael Richard Dimino, Counter-Majoritarian Power and Judges’ 
Political Speech, 58 FLA. L. REV. 53, 84–85 (2006) (discussing composition of the Court under 
Chief Justice William Rehnquist). 
 221. 483 U.S. 435, 439 (1987). 
 222. Id.  
 223. Id. at 450–51. 
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over civilians were likewise not to be discarded.  
Furthermore, that acknowledgement has not waned. In 2005, the 
Roberts Court224 determined in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld225 that military 
jurisdiction could constitutionally be applied to any civilians in areas in 
which martial law had been appropriately declared, as well as in 
“‘occupied enemy territory or territory regained from an enemy where 
civilian government cannot and does not function.’”226 The Court 
identified Madsen, Duncan, and Milligan as demonstrative of such 
circumstances.227 Additionally, affirming the conclusions noted 
previously concerning the irrelevance of a formal declaration of war, the 
Court references the military’s activities in Afghanistan following the 
attacks on September 11, 2001,228 as representative of the theater and 
duration of war.229 Certainly, this could not be true unless the Court 
understood the precedential meaning of “war” to require only the 
presence of actual conflict, and not a formal declaration.  
Thus, in effect, the scope of the constitutionally appropriate 
application of military jurisdiction to civilians during the post-Reid era 
concluded just as it began—though it undertook a wild metamorphosis 
before returning to its traditional moorings. As evidenced by Hamdan, 
military jurisdiction remains constitutionally appropriate in the two 
circumstances established historically in Milligan and later in the Reid 
era—over military members in all cases and over civilians only in times 
of military necessity.230 Of course, military jurisdiction did not escape 
entirely unscathed. Even after Solorio, the Averette court’s restrictive 
statutory interpretation of what was to become 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10) 
                                                                                                                     
 224. See generally Jason Marques, Note, To Bear a Cross: The Establishment Clause, 
Historic Preservation, and Eminent Domain Intersect at the Mt. Soledad Veterans Memorial, 59 
FLA. L. REV. 829, 853 (2007) (discussing composition of the Court under Chief Justice John 
Roberts). 
 225. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006), superseded by Military Commissions Act 
of 2006, Pub. L. No 109-366, § 7, 120 Stat. 2600, 2635–36. However, the relevant provisions of 
the Military Commissions Act have since been found unconstitutional by Boumediene v. Bush, 
128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). 
 226. See id. at 595–96 (quoting Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 314 (1946)). 
Additionally, the Court identified a third appropriate circumstance—the trial of enemy 
individuals for violations of the laws of war—in which the military could exert jurisdiction over 
non-service members. Id. at 596. It was upon this basis that the military sought to subject Salim 
Ahmed Hamdan to its jurisdiction. Id. at 597. Importantly, this basis is beyond the scope of this 
Note. 
 227. See id. at 596. 
 228. See generally Maxwell O. Chibundu, For God, For Country, For Universalism: 
Sovereignty as Solidarity in Our Age of Terror, 56 FLA. L. REV. 883, 883–84 (2004) (describing 
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001). 
 229. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 598–600.  
 230. Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 439 (1987). 
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remained.231 As such, formal congressional action was now required to 
extend military jurisdiction to civilians.232  
V.  CONCLUSION: NO FORMALITIES REQUIRED 
In many respects, the “problem” facing civilian contractors233—their 
newfound amenability to the jurisdiction of the military justice 
system—is of their own design. For nearly forty years,234 such 
individuals had enjoyed the benefit of a jurisdictional gap that rendered 
them free from criminal prosecution.235 “Cowboy” contractors returned 
the favor by embarrassing the United States236 with an impressive litany 
of abuses237 that compelled Congress to act.238 But did Congress act 
appropriately? As stated so eloquently by the Supreme Court 140 years 
prior to the amendment of 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10), no matter how 
wicked an offender might be or to what extent his offenses endanger the 
safety of the country, if the law does not authorize his punishment, then 
it is better to allow that individual to remain unpunished than to violate 
the protections of the law and submit to the “clamor of an excited 
people.”239 Thus, regardless of the perceived need for military 
jurisdiction to combat allegations of contractor abuses in Iraq, the 
determinate question remains: Does the Constitution tolerate the 
statutory expansion of military jurisdiction to civilians serving with or 
accompanying an armed force in the field outside the context of a 
declared war?  
Without a doubt, it does. While the Court has traditionally 
considered the exercise of military jurisdiction over civilians to be 
extraordinary240 and expressed its reluctance to subject civilians to 
such,241 it has never incorporated the need for a formal declaration of 
war in order to justify that extraordinary grant of jurisdiction.242 Rather, 
the Court has focused on the realities faced by military commanders in 
the face of an actively hostile enemy243 and determined that jurisdiction 
                                                                                                                     
 231. United States v. Averette, 19 C.M.A. 363, 365 (1970). 
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 233. Witte, supra note 12 (“‘This looks good on the surface, but it creates far more 
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 234. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 235. See supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text. 
 236. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
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is appropriate in areas in which local invasion or actual military conflict 
has rendered the civil authority incapable of exercising jurisdiction.244 
Furthermore, per Hamdan, military jurisdiction remained particularly 
appropriate in “‘occupied enemy territory or territory regained from an 
enemy where civilian government cannot and does not function.’”245 
Arguably, the situation in Iraq meets all such requirements. Direct, 
local military conflict stripped the local civil authority of the power to 
exercise criminal jurisdiction,246 and, even though that civil authority 
has been restored to some degree, it lacks the authority to subject 
personnel accompanying the U.S. military to local jurisdiction.247 Such 
circumstances are remarkably similar to those present in Madsen,248 in 
which the Court affirmed the exercise of military jurisdiction over a 
U.S. military dependant,249 a decision the Court has never expressed any 
reservations about.250 Indeed, in Reid, the Court explicitly affirmed 
Madsen, distinguishing it from the circumstance in Reid based on the 
fact that Germany had been conquered by force and continued to be 
governed by military authority.251 Certainly, in light of the added insight 
shared in Hamdan, the current conflict in Iraq falls within the category 
of occupied territory in which the civilian courts are incapable of 
subjecting civilians to jurisdiction as a result of ongoing direct military 
conflict.252  
Simply put, that is all that is required. The need for a formal 
declaration of war had never been discussed, much less been at issue, 
until the court in Averette determined such to be necessary to comply 
with the relevant statutory language.253 Still, even this lone contrary 
decision was determined not on the basis of constitutional constraints, 
but rather on the basis of that court’s narrow interpretation of statutory 
language254 following an unprecedented decision by the Court to 
radically restrict the exercise of military jurisdiction over even its own 
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members;255 a decision since overruled by Solorio.256 It would take an 
equally wild departure from established precedent before the Court 
could determine that a formal declaration of war is necessary to 
constitutionally permit expanding military jurisdiction to civilians. 
Notably, the Court’s most modern forays into the realm of military 
jurisdiction demonstrate the unlikelihood of such, as the Court has cited 
the precedential value not of Averette, but rather of those cases it ran 
counter to—namely Milligan, Duncan, Madsen, Kinsella, and Reid.257 
Thus, there seems to be no indication that the amendment to 10 U.S.C. 
§ 802(a)(10) rendered the statute unconstitutional. Congress appears to 
have finally succeeded in enacting an effective method of closing the 
jurisdictional gap previously enjoyed by civilian contractors and thereby 
providing the United States with an effective rope with which to reign 
in cowboy contractors.  
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